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Abstract 
The paper compares mineral resource recovery taxes for oil to be paid in Kazakhstan and 
the RF. It provides a case study on an average Kazakh oil and gas company and presents 
tax calculations as an example.  To compare the taxation systems in Kazakhstan and the 
RF, the situation is modelled as if the field was located in the RF and the relevant 
calculations are carried out in compliance with national laws and regulations. 
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Introduction 
Being one of the leading sectors of many national economies, oil recovery is obviously 
taxed. There is a global challenge to develop an adequate system of taxation to maximize 
the resource rent [1,2]. However, oil companies should get the profit enough to enhance 
production and conduct geological survey [3,4]. Taxation can either encourage or repel 
investments from the economic sector, which, in its turn, either contributes to or hinders 
the development of the industry [5,6]. The development of an adequate taxation system is 
currently a topical issue and it often becomes a cause for agreement reviews or a subject of 
disputes and controversies under international jurisdiction [7]. The research on taxation 
system and plausible effects is rather important since it allows identifying and 
implementing the best practices [8].  
 
Materials and Methods 
The present paper describes a case study of an oil and gas company of Kazakhstan in terms 
of the resource rent paid in Russia and Kazakhstan in compliance with relevant national 
laws and regulations. The comparison was made through calculations based on the data 
from JSC Mangistaumunaigas report over 2014. The petroleum tax calculations were 
carried out regarding a Kazakhstan oil field. The petroleum tax to be paid in compliance 
with Russian laws and regulations was calculated as well. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The mineral resource recovery tax (MRRT) is effective in the RF from January 1, 2002, 
with enactment of Chapter 26 of the Russian Tax Code. Taxpayers of the mineral resource 
recovery tax are individual entrepreneurs and organizations involved in mineral resource 
recovery and having license for the use of subsurface resources.  The tax is comprised of a 
percentage rate, which regularly increases, multiplied by a coefficient depending on global 
oil price and dollar exchange rate.  
In 2014 MRRT on hydrocarbon raw material accounted for 98% of the total tax and 
all regular payments for the use of natural resources. The MRRT on oil input into the 
national budget was 2463.6 billion rubles, which made up 87% of MRRT on hydrocarbon 
raw material and 17% of all national revenues in the RF, respectively [9]. 
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Compared to the taxes effective before the MRRT enactment (payments for mineral 
reserve replacement and the right to use subsurface resources), the MRRT has a number of 
advantages. The major advantage is simplicity of tax administration for both taxpayers and 
the regulatory authority. The simplicity is achieved through transparent systems of tax 
assessment and determination, as well as the absence of tax concessions. Moreover, the tax 
allows national revenues from both the resource rent and the differential oil rent. 
However, there are some limitations of MRRT to be pointed out regarding its effect 
on the economic sector and taxpayers' finance. The major disadvantage is dependence of 
the tax rate (and the amount of payments) on global oil prices.  The dynamics of average 
oil prices (Urals crude oil, USD/bbl) and the range of price index (Ip) values over the 
period 2002–2015 are shown in table 1. The direct dependence of the price index Ip, which 
is used to determine the amount of MRRT in the RF, on global oil prices is obvious. 
 
Table 1. Dynamics of MRRT on oil  
 
Year 
Price 
USD/bbl 
Dollar 
exchange 
rate 
Ip 
Tax rate 
with regard 
to Ip  
(USD) 
Oil 
price, 
USD/ton  
Percentage of 
tax in price per 
1 ton, % 
2015 51 60.98 8.26 103.7 367.2 28.2 
2014 97.6 38.4 11.83 151.8 702.72 21.6 
2013 107.96 31.83 11.34 167.4 777.3 21.5 
2012 110.58 31.09 11.36 162.9 796.2 20.5 
2011 109.55 29.39 10.63 151.6 788.8 19.2 
2010 78.05 30.37 7.34 101.2 561.96 18 
2009 60.74 31.75 5.47 72.4 437.3 16.6 
2008 94.04 24.85 7.95 133 677.1 19.6 
2007 69.43 25.58 5.89 96.6 499.9 19.3 
2006 60.89 27.19 5.4 83.3 438.4 19 
2005 50.2 28.28 4.47 66.2 361.4 18.3 
2004 34.51 28.81 3.03 36.5 248.5 14.7 
2003 27.13 30.69 2.36 26.1 195.3 13.4 
2002 23.72 31.34 1.96 21.3 170.8 12.5 
 
Over the time period from 2002 to 2008, the percentage of tax in price increased 
from 12.5 to 19.6, and then in 2010 decreased to 18%. From 2011 till 2015 MRRT rose 
again. The particular increase in tax load is characteristic for 2015. As table 1 shows, the 
tax burden peaks in the periods of economic crises. Within these periods the tax withdraws 
oil price differential that is due to high global prices for energy sources. When MRRT and 
custom duties are both effective, there is double taxation system: in both cases, the tax 
basis depends on the amount of oil and export prices. Another MRRT limitation is flat 
taxation scale, which fails to be applied with due regard to geological, economic and 
geographic, infrastructural issues, as well as to the particularities in the field development 
and exploration, reserve structure and quality, etc. Therefore, additional benefits are actual 
for the taxpayers whose sites are located in better fields: the recovery is profitable due to 
the simple methods applied for resource extraction. Therefore, national oil production 
increases due to intense exploitation of highly profitable wells neglecting both new field 
exploration and development, as well as new well drilling [10]. 
In Kazakhstan, the issue of adequate natural resource taxation, which maximizes 
national revenues and ensures the profit of subsurface resource users, has always been 
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topical. The taxation system is developed in compliance with the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, which implies that the state holds a monopoly over the use of 
mineral reserves. This corresponds to the international principles of income taxation from 
natural resources.  Over a short time period, the basic principles of petroleum taxation have 
been determined and the legislative framework has been developed. It is noteworthy that in 
Kazakhstan the taxation systems of leading oil-exporting countries are intensively studied 
and best global practices are applied to ensure petroleum sector development and to reach 
the aim set by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, namely, to be in top 50 most 
competitive countries [11]. 
The Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use creates a legislative framework for granting, 
exercising, transferring, and terminating the rights of a subsurface resource user. In 
compliance with the Tax Code, taxes and other mandatory payments are regulated by the 
Tax Code only. These taxation principles have nothing to do with the agreements between 
the government and particular companies [12]. 
In the Republic of Kazakhstan, subsoil user taxation includes corporate income tax, 
oil export rent tax, commercial discovery bonuses, and mineral extraction tax. The only 
exception is production sharing agreements, which became effective before January 1, 
2009, and special contracts approved by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
The mineral resource recovery tax (MRRT) is analogous to the royalty, which is 
based on the recovery amount, and is applied for crude oil, gas condensate and natural gas. 
The rate ranges between 0.5% and 18% depending on the recovery amount. There are 
different rates and bases which are determined by the following factors: what is produced 
and whether production is exported or not. In 2013, the share of MRRT in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan budget revenues accounted for 12%. 
The taxation system in Kazakhstan is inefficient due to uncollected tax debt. There 
should be a system of government monitoring over implementation of enhance recovery 
methods and rational utilization of feedstock, as well as environmental safety [13]. The 
above-mentioned methods will be efficient in case there are amendments to tax legislation 
which will allow using all available funds to ensure social and economic development of 
petroleum producing regions [14]. 
Let  us compare the taxes for crude oil recovered under the same conditions in 
Kazakhstan and Russia. We assume that Kazakh company recovered 15,000 tons of crude 
oil within the first quarter of 2014, with 80000 tons transported to the refinery for 35000 
tenge (equal to 7446.8 rubles) per ton, 5000 used towards production and the rest sold. 
Based on the accounting data, the production cost is 30000 tenge (equal to 6250 rubles) per 
ton. The global oil price over the first quarter of 2014 was 18400 tenge (3833.3 rubles) per 
barrel. The barrels to tons conversion coefficient is 7.2314. As the recovery amount 
planned for 2014 was 450000 tons, which is less than 50000 tons, the tax rate is 7%. As for 
the oil transported to the refinery and used towards production, the tax rate is applied with 
decreased coefficient 0.5, i.e. 7%*0.5=3.5% (in compliance with article 332 (2) of the Tax 
Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan). The MRRT for crude oil over the first quarter of 
2014 is 708662808 tenge (147638085 at the exchange rate in 2014):  
 
MRRT =  ((80 000  ×  35 000 +  5 000  × 30 000)  ×  3.5%) +  (65000 ×
 7.2314 × 18 400 ×  7%) = 708 622808 tenge = 146 638 085 rubles 
 
Let us calculate the tax amount as if this oil (150,000 tons) was recovered in Russia 
(in compliance with article 342 of the Tax Code of the RF). On average the coefficient of 
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world oil price in the first quarter of 2014 was 12.3841 and the tax rate was 493 rubles per 
ton. The MRRT calculation is as follows: 
 
MRRT = 150000 × 12.3841 × 493 × 1 × 1 × 1 = 915 804 195 rubles 
 
(we assume that the coefficient of field depletion (Cfd), the index of reserve stock 
level (Irs) and  the degree of recovery complexity (Drc) are equal to 1).  
The calculation results indicate that under the same conditions the tax amount in 
Russia is six times as much as that in Kazakhstan. This explains higher budget revenues in 
the Russian Federation compared to those in the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a significant difference between the mineral resource recovery taxes in the RF and 
Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, a progressive taxation scale is applied, while in the RF a flat 
taxation scale is used. The progressive taxation in Kazakhstan encourages exploration and 
development of minor oil and gas fields by small companies. As for big companies, the tax 
payments are bigger since they recover greater amounts of oil.  
In the RF, the same approach is applied for both big and small companies. The 
differences in the rate are connected with the type of the field, in other words, the 
decreasing coefficient is applied where the reserves are difficult to extract or if the field 
tends to be depleted. As a result, with oil prices falling, the number of small independent 
companies involved in resource recovery in the RF is decreasing, which strengthens the 
monopoly within the petroleum sector. In this regard, the MRRT in Kazakhstan is more 
flexible and appropriate regarding the taxpayers. Therefore, the progressive minerals 
taxation system of Kazakhstan might be applied in the RF. 
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